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THE SOFTWARE ESCROW: THE COURT
FAVORITE AND BANKRUPTCY LAW
Periklis A. Pappous*
I. INTRODUCTION
The software escrow has become a favorite in the court of
computer lawyers because of its simplicity and perceived fairness.
The software escrow is created when the licensor deposits the
software source code (and related maintenance documents) with an
escrow, who promises to deliver the deposited material to the licen-
see if the licensor fails to maintain the software, becomes insolvent,
or files for bankruptcy. Once created, the software escrow is
deemed to be fair, yielding neither to the licensor nor to the licensee
while advancing the interests of both. The software escrow ad-
vances the interests of the licensor in several ways: it prevents the
unauthorized duplication or modification of the source code, keeps
it a secret under trade secret law, and preserves it unpublished
under copyright law.' By promising to deliver the deposited mate-
rial if certain conditions occur, the software escrow also advances
the interests of the licensee. Although the software escrow seems to
have earned its favored position on merit, the time has come, if not
to banish this favorite from court, at least to alert its patrons to its
probable invalidity under bankruptcy law.
The software escrow's probable invalidity under bankruptcy
law may be exposed in the context of five issues:
1) Whether the deposited materials constitute "property of
the estate" under Section 541 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act of
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1. A trade secret is information that (1) is used in one's business, (2) provides a com-
petitive advantage, and (3) is secret. Kewanee Oil Co. v Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 474
(1974); see also RESTATEMENT OF TORTS § 757 comment b (1939) (defining trade secret).
It is not settled whether the source code is indeed "unpublished." For a collection of
cases expressing differing views, see Nycum, Kenfleld and Keenan, Debugging Software Es-
crow: Will It Work When You Need It?, 4 COMPUTER L. J. 441,446, n.7 (1984) [hereinafter
cited as Nycum, Debugging Software Escrow].
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19782 (hereinafter B.R.A.);
2) Whether the "automatic stay" of B.R.A. Section 362
prevents any action by the licensee to force the escrow to deliver
the deposited material;
3) Whether, if delivery is made, the delivery is a "prefer-
ence" under B.R.A. Section 547 or a "post-petition transfer"
under B.R.A. Section 549;
4) Whether the bankruptcy trustee can use, sell, or lease the
deposited material; and
5) Whether the software escrow is an "executory contract"
under B.R.A. Section 365.
As each of these issues is discussed in detail, it will be demon-
strated that the basic expectation of the licensee - to receive the
deposited material if certain conditions occur - is illusory. Since
the software escrow is unfair if the licensee is unable to receive the
deposited material, planning suggestions will be made on how the
software escrow can fulfill its intended function in the face of bank-
ruptcy law.3
II. ANALYSIS
A. Property of the Estate
The software escrow is usually conditioned in part upon the
financial solvency or the bankruptcy of the licensor. If the licensor
falls into financial straits or files for bankruptcy, the licensee expects
to receive the deposited materials. B.R.A. Section 541 renders this
expectation illusory. It thwarts the intended operation of the
software escrow by converting all of the licensor's property interests
2. Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978 §§ 101 et. seq., 11 U.S.C. §§ 101 et. seq. (1982)
[hereinafter B.R.A.].
3. The question of jurisdiction should be settled at this point. The rule is that the U.S.
District Courts have jurisdiction over bankruptcy cases but also the power to refer them to
the U.S. Bankruptcy Courts. See generally Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship
Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353 (H.R. 5714) July 10, 1984, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 6 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEWS (West Aug. 1984). Technically, the U.S. District Courts have: original
and exclusive jurisdiction of all bankruptcy cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(a); original
but not exclusive jurisdiction of all civil proceedings arising under or related to bankruptcy
cases pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b); and exclusive jurisdiction of all property of the debtor,
wherever located, as of the commencement of the case pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1334(d). The
U.S. Bankruptcy Court is a "unit" of the U.S. District Court, and the District Court may
refer to it all bankruptcy cases and all "core proceedings" arising thereunder. 28 U.S.C.
§ 151, 157(a). "Core proceedings" include orders to turn over property of the estate, pro-
ceedings to determine, avoid, or recover preferences, motions to terminate or modify the
automatic stay and orders approving the use or lease of property. 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2). The
U.S. Bankruptcy Court may also hear "related proceedings," with the final order to be en-
tered by the U.S. District Court. 28 U.S.C. § 157(c).
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as of the commencement of the case into property of the estate and
by invalidating the software escrow's condition that the licensee will
receive the deposited material upon the licensor's insolvency or
commencement of a bankruptcy case.
B.R.A. Section 541 provides that the commencement of a case
creates an estate, comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of the
debtor in property as of the commencement of the case" and of
certain post-petition property.4 This section allows the trustee to
collect all of the debtor's property, determine its value, and to dis-
tribute either the property or the proceeds from it to the creditors.'
Whether the debtor has any interest in property is a state law ques-
tion.6 Whether the debtor's interest in property is property of the
estate is a federal question.7 Contractual provisions relating to the
debtor's interest in property and conditioned on the debtor's insol-
vency or financial condition or commencement of a case are inva-
lid.8 The estate has the benefit of any defenses available to the
debtor.9 Property of the estate is generally immune from creditor
action"0 and is distributed to creditors according to bankruptcy law.
When the bankruptcy case commences, the licensor has title to
the deposited material and presumably enjoys the protection of
trade secret and copyright law for that material. The licensor, in
other words, has property interests in the deposited material. These
property interests are drawn into the bankruptcy estate under the
phrase "all legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property."
This phrase is extremely broad, including property wherever lo-
cated: "interests in real or personal property, tangible and intangi-
ble property, choses in action, rights such as copyrights,
trademarks, patents, and processes, contingent interests and future
interests, whether or not transferable by the debtor"11 as well as
4. B.R.A. § 541(a)(1), B.R.A. §§ 541(a)(5),(7).
5. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., p. 176 [hereinafter cited as HOUSE REPORT]; 9
BANKR. L. ED. § 82:6 (Bancroft-Whitney 1979 & Supp. 1984).
6. In re Turner, 29 Bankr. 628, 630 (Bankr. D. Me. 1983).
7. Re Loughnane, 28 Bankr. 940, 8 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MATTHEW-BENDER)
512 (Bankr. D.C. Colo. 1983).
8. B.R.A. § 541(c); S. REP. No. 987, 95th Cong., p. 83 [hereinafter cited as SENATE
REPORT 987]; and see generally 2 BANKR. L. ED. § 23:10 (Bancroft-Whitney 1983 & Supp.
1984).
9. B.R.A. § 541(e); and see generally 2 BANKR. L. ED. § 23:12 (Bancroft-Whitney
1983 & Supp 1984).
10. See the discussion on the "automatic stay" of B.R.A. § 362 text accompanying
notes 21 - 45.
11. HousE REPORT at 175; SENATE REPORT 987, at 82; and see Lines v. Frederick, 400
U.S. 18, 91 S. Ct. 113 (1970); Segal v. Rochelle, 382 U.S. 375, 86 S. Ct. 511 (1966).
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"title" to property and leasehold or possessory interests.12 The de-
posited material is tangible property to which the licensor has title.
The trade secret or copyright protection for that material is intangi-
ble property in which the licensor has interests. The deposited ma-
terial, consisting of tangible and intangible property, becomes
property of the estate despite the fact that the tangible property is
out of the possession of the licensor."3 As part of the property of
the estate, the desposited material is temporarily insulated from
creditors and cannot be distributed to them; in the software escrow
context this means that the licensee will not receive the deposited
material pursuant to the terms of the escrow.
B.R.A. Section 541(a)(1) draws the deposited material into the
bankruptcy estate. B.R.A. Section 541(c) invalidates the software
escrow's condition that the licensee will receive the deposited mate-
rial upon the licensor's insolvency or commencement of a bank-
ruptcy case. The purpose of B.R.A. Section 541(c) is to ensure that
all of the interests of the debtor in property become property of the
estate.14 The effect of the provision is to thwart the intended opera-
tion of the software escrow. In the view of a leading commentator,
The law or agreement covering the ownership or holding of the
interest may purport to terminate or forfeit the interest upon the
filing of a petition for relief under the bankruptcy law, upon in-
solvency, the appointment of a receiver or upon certain financial
condition of the debtor. Outside of the bankruptcy court, the
debtor may well be bound by these provisions or limitations.
The debtor's estate is not bound and may disregard them. In this
sense the property of the estate is greater in value than when the
debtor had it. 15
B.R.A. Section 541 may be fatal to the software escrow; but
proper planning, based on bankruptcy case law on letters of credit
and ordinary escrows, can eliminate that pernicious effect.
Bankruptcy case law on letters of credit generally holds that
the customer's filing for bankruptcy does not effect the right of the
beneficiary to seek payment from the bank.16 The letter of credit, a
payment mechanism used by merchants, consists of three agree-
12. HOUSE REPORT at 175; SENATE REPORT 987, at 82.
13. B.R.A. § 541(a) provides, "Such estate is comprised of all the following property,
wherever located. . ." (emphasis added). The legislative history is equally clear.
14. SENATE REPORT 987, at 83.
15. COWANS, BANIRUPTCY LAW AND PRAcTcE.495 (interim ed. 1983) [hereinafter
cited as CowANs BANKRUPTCY LAW].
16. Hahn & Schwartz, Letters of Credit Under the Bankruptcy Code, 16 U.C.C. L.J. 91,
102 (1983) [hereinafter cited as Hahn & Schwartz, Letters of Credit].
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ments: the agreement between the bank and its customer, specify-
ing that the beneficiary is to be paid if certain conditions occur; the
letter of credit itself, an obligation of the bank to the beneficiary;
and the underlying agreement between the customer and the benefi-
ciary.1 7 The reason that the beneficiary is free to seek payment is
that the funds are property of the bank, not of the debtor."8 Thus,
in the software escrow context:
[I]f the transaction can be structured to separate the relation-
ships between escrow agent-licensor and escrow agent-licensee
sufficiently, and to make clear that the licensor has long since
parted with all possessory rights to the deposited materials, then
it may be possible to persuade the bankruptcy court that the im-
portance of delivery, in terms of carrying out the intentions of
the parties and avoiding irreparable harm to the licensee, is such
that delivery should be allowed. Furthermore, if the duty to de-
liver the deposited materials arises from a contract to which the
licensor is not a party, then the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy
court to consider the matter is open to dispute.' 9
Bankruptcy law on ordinary escrows, which may be relied on
at least by analogy, holds that escrowed property is property of the
estate unless the debtor was divested of his interests in it before the
bankruptcy case commenced.2' Since the deposited material cannot
become property of the estate unless the licensor has a property in-
terest in it, the release of the deposited material, free of any interest
of the licensor, should be conditioned on an event independent of
the financial situation or the bankruptcy of the licensor. Condition-
ing the release of the deposited material on a non-financial event
also neutralizes the invalidating effect of B.R.A. Section 541(c).
The practical problem is that the licensor may not wish to agree to a
complete divestiture of his interests upon the occurrence of any
17. Id. at 91; McLaughlin, Letters of Credit As Preferential Transfers in Bankruptcy, 50
FORDHAM L. REv. 1033, 1036-40.
18. Hahn & Schwart7, Letters of Credit at 99.
19. Nycum, Debugging Software Escrow at 441, 457-58.
20. See, In re Newcomb, 32 Bankr. 96, 98 (Bankr. W. D. Mo. 1983)(money placed in
escrow was property of the estate as of the date of filing); Turner, 29 Bankr. 628, 630 (Bankr.
D. Me. 1983) (debtor's contingent interest in real estate deposit held in escrow became prop-
erty of the estate upon filing); and Heckler Land Dev. Co., 15 Bankr. 856, 858 (Bankr. E. D.
Penn. 1981) (construction bond was property of the estate). But see Biller, 27 Bankr. 206
(Bankr. M.D. Penn. 1982) (escrowed funds for progress payments not property of the estate if
the contractor has performed the required work before the commencement of the bankruptcy
case); . Hyman Constr., 15 Bankr. 765, 767 (Bankr. D. Md. 1981) (valid escrow agreement
provided that funds would be released upon the resolution of litigation; this condition prece-
dent having occurred before the date of filing, the debtor had no legal or equitable interest in
the funds).
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event, but the resolution of that problem must be sought on a case-
by-case basis.
B. The Automatic Stay
The licensee expects to have access to the software source code
and the related maintenance documents if the licensor files for
bankruptcy. This expectation may be great, but, again, it is illusory.
The deposited material is property of the estate, and the "automatic
stay" of B.R.A. Section 362 bars any action by the licensee to ob-
tain it. The veracity of this statement will be demonstrated by dis-
cussing the automatic stay and the licensee's initially plausible, but
decidedly futile, efforts to escape or to overcome its operation.
Under B.R.A. Section 362, the filing of bankruptcy "operates
as a stay, applicable to all entities, of. . .any action to obtain pos-
session of property of the estate or of property from the estate."
The automatic stay, a fundamental debtor protection, insulates the
debtor from his creditors and provides him with a "breathing spell
and time to work constructively with its creditors. '21 The auto-
matic stay also prevents a race of diligence by creditors, thus fur-
thering the bankruptcy goal of equality of treatment.22 Unless an
exception is shown to apply,2 3 the automatic stay remains in effect
until terminated automatically or until lifted for cause upon the re-
quest of a party in interest.24 Since the filing of the petition serves
as notice to the world, the automatic stay operates even against
creditors who lack actual knowledge of the pendency of the bank-
ruptcy proceedings.25 Innocent violators of the automatic stay
must return to the trustee the property transferred or, if the court so
orders, the value of the property.26 Knowing violators are subject
to contempt of court.27 The party requesting relief from the auto-
matic stay has the burden of proof on cause; the party opposing the
21. HOUSE REPORT, at 340.
22. Re Baum, 15 Bankr. 538, 5 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 745, BANKR L. REP.
(CCH) 1 68,454 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1981); Re Feimster, 3 Bankr. 11, 6 BANKR. CT. DEC.
(CRR) 131, 1 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 956 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979); HousE REPORT
at 341.
23. See B.R.A. § 362(b)(1)-(8).
24. B.R.A. § 362(c),(d),(f); and see generally 1 BANK. L. ED. § 15:39 (Bancroft-
Whitney 1983 & Supp. 1984).
25. Re Carter, 16 Bankr. 481 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1981), aff'd 691 F.2d 390, 9 BANKR.
CT. DEC. (CRR) 1086, 7 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2D (MB) 683, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 1
68,882 (8th Cir. Mo.).
26. B.R.A. § 550; and see generally COwANs BANKRUPTCY LAW § 10.9.
27. Re Nelson, 6 Bankr. 248, 6 BANKR. Cr. DEC. (CRR) 985,2 COLLIER BANKR. CAS.
2D (MB) 1288 (Bankr. D.C. Kan. 1980). 1
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relief has the burden of proof on all other issues.2"
The licensee who wants to escape or to overcome the operation
of the automatic stay and thus to gain access to the deposited mate-
rial may make several arguments: first, that the automatic stay does
not apply because, for the purposes of bankruptcy law, the licensee
is not an "entity" that has done an "act" to "obtain possession of
property of the estate or of property from the estate"; second, that
even if the automatic stay does apply an exception is met; third, that
the automatic stay should be lifted for cause; and fourth, that the
deposited material is abandoned and no longer property of the es-
tate. Although based on the bankruptcy code itself, these argu-
ments are only initially plausible.
The automatic stay operates against all "entities" who "act" to
"obtain possession of property of the estate or of property from the
estate."29 Therefore, the licensee must argue that it is not an "en-
tity" or that it has done no "act" to obtain "property of the estate"
or "of property from the estate." Success on either argument will
prevent the operation of the automatic stay against the licensee.
The bankruptcy code's definition of the word "entity" is com-
prehensive. Under B.R.A. Section 101 (14), "entity" includes "per-
son, estate, trust, [and] governmental unit." The words "estate"
and "trust," undefined in the code, should be understood in their
customary sense. 30  The word "person" is broadly defined by
B.R.A. Section 101 (30) to include individuals, partnerships, and
corporations. The word "governmental unit" encompasses both
domestic and foreign governments at all levels of the political hier-
archy.31 The conclusion is that the licensee is an "entity," and thus
subject to the automatic stay.
The licensee's alternate argument against the operation of the
automatic stay is that compelling delivery of the deposited material
is not an act to obtain property from the estate. The word "act" is
not defined in the code, but the licensee could not reasonably argue
that letters or phone calls or personal appearances at the escrow's
premises are not affirmative acts. The deposited material is unques-
28. B.R.A. § 362(g)(1),(2); 2 BANKR. L. ED. § 15:54 (Bancroft-Whitney 1983 & Supp.
1984).
29. B.R.A. § 362(a)(3); seven other enumerated acts are also stayed upon the com-
mencement of the case. See B.R.A. § 362(a)(1),(2),(4),(5),(6),(7),(8).
30. "Estate" is defined as the degree, quantity, nature and extent of interest which a
person has in real and personal property, and "Trust" is defined as a right of property, real or
personal held by one party for the benefit of another. BLACK'S LAW DICIoNARY 490-91
(West ed. 1979).
31. B.R.A. § 101(21).
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tionably "property of the estate" under the typical software escrow.
The estate was created when the licensor filed for bankruptcy; at
that moment it was comprised of "all legal or equitable interests of
the debtor [the licensor] in property," whether tangible or intangi-
ble, including property that was merely out of the licensor's posses-
sion and property to which the licensor had title.32 The deposited
material would remain outside of the estate only if the licensor had
originally divested itself of both legal and equitable title over the
deposited material. But the licensor would not have agreed to such
a complete divestiture of ownership; indeed, the software escrow is
generally set up in reponse to his refusal to do so.
Since the automatic stay does apply to the software escrow, the
licensee must next argue that an exception to the automatic stay is
met. Eight exceptions exist under B.R.A. Section 362(b).33 Unfor-
tunately for the licensee, all eight exceptions are on their face inap-
plicable to the software escrow.
Failing to show that the automatic stay does not apply to the
software escrow or that an exception is met, the licensee may at-
tempt to have the stay lifted for cause. B.R.A. Section 362(d)
states:
[O]n request of a party in interest and after notice and hearing,
the court shall grant relief from the stay . . . (1) for cause, in-
cluding the lack of adequate protection of an interest in property
. . . or (2) [because] the debtor has no equity in the property and
the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization.3 4
The request for relief from the stay must be made on motion35 and
is deemed granted unless the court acts on it within thirty days.A6
Ex parte relief from the stay is available where necessary to prevent
immediate irreparable damage to the interest of an entity in
property.3 7
32. B.R.A. § 541(a)(1); and see § IIA, supra of this article for a detailed analysis of the
concept of "property of the estate." The legislative history is clear that § 541 is intended to
allow the trustee to "bring all property together for a coherent evaluation of its value and
transferability, and then dispose of it for the benefit of the debtor's creditors." HOUSE RE-
PORT at 176. See also HousE REPORT at 379 on the scope of § 541, and In re Carla Charcoal,
Inc., 14 Bankr. 644 (Bankr. W.D. La. 1981) (escrowed funds were found to be property of the
estate).
33. See generally 2 BANKR. L. ED. § 15:29 (Bancroft-Whitney 1983 & Supp. 1984) and
CowAs BANKRuPrcy LAW § 11.6.
34. See generally 2 BANKR. L. ED. § 15:42 (Bancroft-Whitney 1983 & Supp. 1984).
35. Bankruptcy Rule 4001 (Relief from Automatic Stay; Use of Cash Collateral).
36. B.R.A. § 362(d). The reason for this is found in the legislative history. "Court
delay in handling requests for relief amounts to a complete denial of relief. The court can
thus avoid the issue, yet rule in the debtor's favor." HOUSE REPoRT at 475.
37. B.R.A. § 362(1); and see Bankruptcy Rule 4001(c).
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The key issue under B.R.A. Section 362(d)(1) is whether the
licensee has standing to sue for relief from the automatic stay as a
"party in interest" that lacks "adequate protection of an interest in
property." Most cases find that only secured creditors have stand-
ing to argue the lack of adequate protection,38 yet a dissenting
voice is occasionally heard.39 The legislative history to B.R.A. Sec-
tion 361 (entitled "Adequate Protection") supports the position of
the majority. The concept of adequate protection, the legislative
history reads, is derived from the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause and is intended to ensure that secured creditors are not de-
prived of the benefit of their bargain." The licensee, an unsecured
creditor, could not convince most courts to lift the automatic stay
for lack of adequate protection.
Cause for lifting the automatic stay under B.R.A. Section
362(d)(2) is that the debtor has no equity in the property and that
the property is not necessary to an effective reorganization. This
subsection affords no comfort to the licensee. The legislative his-
tory states that B.R.A. Section 362(d)(2) is intended "to solve the
problem of the real-property mortgage foreclosures of property
where bankruptcy is filed on the eve of foreclosure."41 The licen-
sor's continuing property interests in the deposited material is an
insurmountable problem for the licensee; also, B.R.A. Section
362(d)(2) is addressed to real property, not personal property such
as software source code and related documentation.
The licensee, laboring under an automatic stay to which he
cannot find an arguable exception and which he cannot lift for
cause, may attempt to have the deposited material abandoned as
"burdensome to the estate or. . . [as] inconsequential of value to
the estate."'4 Property abandoned ceases to be property of the es-
tate; and the automatic stay operates only against property of the
estate.4 3 But abandonment would not benefit the licensee. Aban-
38. See, e.g., Re Alyucan Interstate Corp., 12 Bankr. 803, 7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR)
1123, 4 COLLIER BANKR. CAS. 2D (MB) 1066 (Bankr. D.C. Utah 1981) and the other cases
collected in 12 BANKR. L. ED. (Awareness Alert) (Bancroft-Whitney May 1984).
39. See Re Holtkamp, 669 F.2d 505, 8 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 957, 5 COLLIER
BANKR. CAs. 2D (MB) 1412, BANKR. L. REP. (CCH) 68,598 (7th Cir. Ind. 1982) (neither
statute nor legislative history suggest that only secured creditors have standing in this
connection).
40. HOUSE REPORT at 349 and see S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong. 2d Session, (1978) pp.
49-54 [hereinafter cited as SENATE REPORT 989].
41. See 2 BANKR. L. ED. § 15:42 (Bancroft-Whitney 1979 & Supp. 1984).
42. B.R.A. § 554; Bankruptcy Rule 6007 (Abandonment or Disposition of Property);
and see generally COwA_ s BANKRuPTcY LAW §§ 9.9, 11.8.
43. See B.R.A. § 362(c)(1).
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donment is made, not to unsecured creditors in the troubled posi-
tion of the licensee, but to "any party with a possessory interest in
the property abandoned."'
Because of the automatic stay, then, the licensee cannot obtain
the deposited material under the typical software escrow that condi-
tions delivery to the licensee upon the bankruptcy of the licensor.
The automatic stay would, of course, be an obstacle to the licensee
even if the escrow, rather than the licensor, filed for bankruptcy; but
the patrons of the software escrow have apparently not considered
this contingency either. Regardless of whether the licensor or the
escrow filed for bankruptcy, the licensee would not have access to
the deposited material until the automatic stay terminated automat-
ically when the bankruptcy case was closed or dismissed or, in cer-
tain instances, when the discharge was granted or denied.45
C. Preferences and Post-petition Transfers
The automatic stay, which bars any action by the licensee to
obtain the deposited material when the licensor files for bankruptcy,
does not operate against the escrow itself. The escrow already has
possession of the deposited material. The licensee - and all the
patrons of the software escrow - may therefore expect the escrow
to deliver the deposited material to the licensee either before or after
the filing of the petition for bankruptcy. This expectation is proba-
bly illusory. The trustee for the debtor potentially has the power to
avoid the pre-bankruptcy delivery as a "preference";46 the trustee
also potentially has the power to avoid the post-bankruptcy delivery
as a "post-petition transaction."'47
1. Preference
A preference is any pre-bankruptcy transfer of the debtor's
property that the trustee proves falls within the definition of "pref-
erence" in B.R.A. Section 547(b). The trustee may avoid any pref-
erence, except to the extent to which the preferential transfer is
44. HOUSE REPORT at 377.
45. B.R.A. § 362(c)(2).
46. See B.R.A. § 547 (Preferences) and B.R.A. § 548 (Fraudulent Transfers and Obli-
gations). See also Re Newcomb, 32 Bankr. 96 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (money in hands of
escrow is property of the estate; if transferred before bankruptcy, it is a preference; if trans-
ferred after bankruptcy, it is a post-petition transfer).
47. See B.R.A. § 549 (Post-petition Transactions). The debtor-in-possession is vested
with the avoidance powers of the trustee under B.RLA. § 1107(a).
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insulated by an exception. 48 The trustee's power to avoid prefer-
ences discourages creditors "from racing to the courthouse to dis-
member the debtor during his slide into bankruptcy" and facilitates
the bankruptcy policy of equality of distribution among creditors.49
A preference is unlikely to arise in the context of a software escrow;
the escrow is supposed to deliver the deposited material after, not
before, the licensor files for bankruptcy. Yet the escrow may mis-
take the actual date of filing or misunderstand the instructions of
the software escrow agreement. The issue would then be whether
the transfer was a voidable preference and, if so, whether any of the
exceptions applied.
Pursuant to B.R.A. section 547(b), a preference is any transfer
of the property of the debtor:
(1) to or for the benefit of a creditor;
(2) for or on account of an antecedent debt owed by the debtor
before such transfer was made;
(3) made while the debtor was insolvent;
(4) made:
(A) on or within 90 days before the date of the filing of
the petition; or
(B) between 90 days and one year before the date of tae
filing of the petition, if such creditor, at the time of such
transfer
(i) was an insider; and
(ii) had reasonable cause to believe the debtor was
insolvent at the time of such transfer; and
(5) that enables such creditor to receive more than such credi-
tor would receive if -
(A) the case were a case under chapter 7 of this title;
(B) the transfer had not been made; and
(C) such creditor received payment of such debt to the
extent provided by the provisions of this title.
The issues raised by this statute - property of the debtor,
creditor, antecedent debt, insolvency, time of transfer, and relative
distribution - will be discussed in the order that facilitates
analysis.
a. Property of the Debtor
"Property of the debtor" presumably is co-extensive with the
48. See B.ILA. § 547(b),(c). See also Re A.J. Nichols, Ltd., 21 Bankr. 612 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1982) (burden of proof is on the trustee).
49. HousE REPORT at 177-78; Re Davis, 22 Bankr. 644, 9 BANKR. Cr. DEC. (CRR)
657, 6 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2D (MB) 1391 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1982).
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definition of "property of the estate" in B.R.A. section 541,50 which
includes the deposited material.
b. Creditor
The licensee may or may not be a "creditor" of the licensor in
the context of a software escrow. The word "creditor" means an
"entity that has a claim against the debtor that arose at the time or
before the order for relief . . . ,,15 A "claim" means either a
"right to payment" or the "right to an equitable remedy for breach
of performance, if such breach gives rise to a right to payment. '52
The licensee is indeed an "entity." But it has a "claim against the
debtor [the licensor]" only if the licensor, before filing for bank-
ruptcy, had somehow breached the software escrow agreement, e.g.,
by failing to maintain the source code and related maintenance ma-
terial. The licensor's filing for bankruptcy, in itself, cannot consti-
tute a breach of contract.53
c. Time of Transfer
A transfer is any. transfer of interest in property.54 A transfer
is made when perfection occurs; in the case of personal property,
perfection occurs when the transfer is valid against a creditor who
subsequently obtains a judicial lien,55 or "immediately before the
date of the filing of the petition."56 Thus, the escrow is deemed to
have made the transfer of the deposited material to the licensee the
day before the licensor actually filed for bankruptcy.
d. Insolvency
For purposes of the preference section, "the debtor is presumed
to have been insolvent on and during the 90 days immediately pre-
ceding the date of the filing of the petition. '5 7 Since the escrow
could hardly miss the actual bankruptcy date by more than three
50. WHITE & SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE 1003 (2d ed. 1980) [hereinaf-
ter cited as WHrrE & SUMMERS].
51. B.R.A. § 101(9). The word creditor is defined even more broadly by the courts.
See Cooper Petroleum Co. v. Hart, 379 F.2d 777 (5th Cir. 1967).
52. B.,.A. § 101(4).
53. The language of B.R.A. § 365(e)(1) leaves no doubt on this point.
54. B.R.A. § 101(41).
55. B.R.A. § 547(e)(2); Re Mailbag Int'l, Inc., 28 Bankr. 905, 10 BANKR. Cr. DEC.
(CRR) 496, BAKR . L. REP. (CCH) 69,173 (Bankr. D.C. Conn. 1983).
56. B.R.A. § 547(e)(2)(C); and see generally 3 BANKR. L. ED. § 23:62 (Bancroft-
Whitney 1979 & Supp. 1984).
57. B.RLA. § 547(0; Re K. Pritchard Co., 17 Bankr. 508, 6 COLLIER BANKR. CAs. 2D
(MB) 63 (Bankr. S.D. Ala. 1981). The presumption is as defined in FED. R. EVID. 301.
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months, the trustee may easily prove that the licensor was insolvent
when the deposited material was transferred to the licensee.18
e. Antecedent Date
The potentially preferential transfer must have been for or on
account of an "antecedent debt." The word "debt" means "liability
on a claim."59  As mentioned supra, ° the licensee has a claim
against the licensor only if the licensor has breached the software
escrow agreement or a related software license agreement. No ex-
plicit definition of "antecedent" exists in the bankruptcy code.
However, the delivery of the deposited material is at least arguably
on account of an antecedent debt (if a debt indeed existed), since the
licensee failed to give "new value" for it.6
f Relative Distribution
The last element of an avoidable preference, that the creditor
must receive more than he would have received in a Chapter 7 liqui-
dation,62 is of no consequence to fully-secured creditors but exposes
unsecured creditors (such as the licensee) to the trustee's avoidance
powers. Pursuant to this last element, the bankruptcy court has to
inquire as to the relative distribution between classes of creditors
and as to the amount received by the members of the particular
class.6" In a Chapter 7 liquidation, fully-secured creditors receive
either their collateral or the proceeds from their collateral;4 thus, a
pre-bankruptcy transfer cannot possibly enable them to receive
more than they would have at liquidation.6" Unsecured creditors
are in an entirely different position. Their lot is to sharepro rata in
58. WHrrE & SUMMERS at 1004 state that "[t]he presumption of insolvency in subsec-
tion 547(0 will effectively eliminate that issue from the usual voidable preference case."
59. B.R.A. § 101(11).
60. See text accompanying notes 51-54.
61. This is the position taken by WHITE & SUMMERS, 1003-04 on the basis of B.RLA.
§ 547(a)(2).
62. B.R.A. § 547(b)(5). B.R.A. § 547(b)(5) (1984).
63. 3 BANKR. L. ED. § 23:53 (Bancroft-Whitney 1979 & Supp. 1984).
64. This is the consequence of several provisions of the bankruptcy code. See B.R.A.
§ 362(c)(1) (stay terminates automatically when collateral is no longer property of the estate);
B.R.A. § 554 (abandonment of property of the estate); B.R.A. § 707 (dismissal); and B.R.A.
§ 362(d) (relief from automatic stay - repossession of collateral possible). See also B.R.A.
§ 363(0 (secured creditor consent to sale of collateral); B.R.A. § 722 (debtor redemption of
tangible personal property); B.R.A. § 725 (disposition of property co-owned by the estate and
another entity); B.R.A. § 726 (distribution of property of the estate); and B.R.A. § 704(1)
(trustee must collect and reduce to money the property of the estate).
65. See the hypothetical in W HrrE & SUMMERS atlO04-05.
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the balance of the estate.66 Since the balance of the estate is never
enough to satisfy the claims of all the unsecured creditors, a pre-
bankruptcy transfer that satisfies any one unsecured creditor's claim
in full is immediately suspect as a preference. Depending on the
licensee's claim, therefore, the element of relative distribution is po-
tentially met when the licensee, an unsecured creditor that is to
sharepro rata in the estate, receives the deposited material prior to
the licensor's bankruptcy.
Discussion of the elements of a preference - property of the
debtor, creditor, antecedent debt, time of transfer, insolvency, and
relative distribution - leads to the conclusion that in the context of
the software escrow the trustee may avoid as a preference a pre-
bankruptcy transfer of the deposited material to the licensee.6 7 The
transfer is only insulated from attack to the extent that it comes
under one of the exceptions of B.R.A. section 547(c). As with the
exceptions to the automatic stay, however, all six exceptions are on
their face inapplicable to the software escrow.68
2. Post-petition Transfer
B.R.A. section 549 nullifies any post-petition delivery of the
deposited material to the licensee. Pursuant to the statute, the
trustee may avoid any post-petition transfer of property of the estate
that was unauthorized or that was authorized under a section pro-
tecting only the transferor.69 There are two statutory limitations to
this avoidance power of the trustee; neither benefits the escrow.
B.R.A. section 549(b) limits the trustee's avoidance power in favor
of "involuntary gap" transferees, but only to the extent of any value
given after the commencement of the case and before the order for
relief.70 B.R.A. section 549(c) protects bonafide purchasers of real
66. B.R.A. §§ 726, 507.
67. Nimmer, Security Interests in Bankruptcy: An Overview of§ 547 of the Code, 17
Hous. L. REv. 289 (1981), sees this statute as a strict liability law.
68. See COWANS BANKRUPTcY LAW § 10.8 for a lucid discussion of the six exceptions
of B.R.A. § 547(c). See also BANKR. L. ED. (Bancroft-Whitney 1979 & Supp. 1984)
§§ 23:55, 23:56, 23:57, 23:58, 23:59. 23:60, and 23:61.
69. See, In re Newcomb, 32 Bankr. 96 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983) (B.R.A. § 549 violation
occurs if escrow transfers escrowed money to the judgment creditor after the date of the
petition pursuant to the terms of the escrow agreement). The sections that protect only the
transferor are B.R.A. § 303(0 (allowing the debtor in an involuntary case to "continue to use,
acquire, or dispose property. . .") and B.RtA. § 542(c) (regarding transfers of property of
the estate by entities with "neither actual notice nor actual knowledge of the commencement
of the case").
For legislative history on B.R.A. § 549, see SENATE REPORT 989, at 90, and HousE
REPORT at 387.
70. See generally Rochelle & Feder, Unauthorized Sales of a Debtor's Property: The
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property on the theory that the filing of the petition, without more,
should not preclude BFP status.7 1 The burden of proof of the valid-
ity of a post-petition transfer is on the transferee;72 and in this con-
nection the transferee's lack of knowledge of the bankruptcy
proceedings is irrelevant.73 The trustee must sue to avoid a post-
petition transfer before the case is closed or dismissed, or within
two years after the date of the transfer, whichever is earlier.74
D. The Trustee's Power to Use, Sell, or Lease Property of
the Estate
The raison d'etre of a software escrow is to release the depos-
ited material to the licensee upon the licensor's insolvency, bank-
ruptcy, or failure to maintain the deposited material. The
bankruptcy code's sections on the automatic stay and on prefer-
ences and post-petition transfers prevent the release of the deposited
material or, if the material has already been released, authorize the
trustee to reclaim it. Their sections thus frustrate the licensee's ba-
sic expectation regarding the software escrow. Yet these sections do
not necessarily deny the licensee the deposited material for all time;
depending on the circumstances, the licensee might receive the de-
posited material as a general creditor upon the liquidation of the
estate or under an approved plan. The licensee's chances of having
this good fortune are slim indeed, but at least hope exists. B.R.A.
section 363 empowers the trustee to dash even this slim hope of the
licensee.
Pursuant to B.R.A. section 363, the trustee has the power to
use, lease, or sell property of the estate - and this power has sur-
vived constitutional challenges based on the Due Process Clause.75
The trustee's power extends to transactions either outside the ordi-
nary course of business or in the ordinary course of business. 7 In
either case, however, it is limited to account for the interests of
Rights of a Purchaser Under § 549 of the Bankruptcy Code 57 AM. BANIR. L. J. 23 (1983)
(Supp. 1984).
71. See 3 BANKR. L. ED. § 23:72 (Bancroft-Whitney 1979 & Supp. 1984).
72. See Bankruptcy Rule 6001.
73. HOUSE REPORT at 375; Re Jepsco Bldg. Materials, Inc., 15 Bankr. 122 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1981).
74. B.R.A. § 549(d); Re Burstein-Applebee Co., 30 Bankr. 779 (Bankr. W.D. Ma.
1983).
75. See the cases collected in 2 BANKR. L. ED. § 15:79 (Bancroft-Whitney 1979 &
Supp. 1984).
76. See B.R.A. § 363(b),(c). See also Bankruptcy Rule 6004. The debtor-in-possession
gets the powers of the trustee pursuant to B.R.A. § 1107(a).
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third parties in the property.77 The trustee's power to effect non-
ordinary course transactions is limited only by the requirement for
notice and the opportunity for a hearing.78 The trustee's power to
effect ordinary course transactions is limited: by the court's order
authorizing the particular transaction;79 by the statute's conditional
prohibition against transactions involving "cash collateral"; 80 by
the trustee's duty to segregate and account for any cash collateral; 81
and by the code's concept of adequate protection.82 Yet, under cer-
tain circumstances, the trustee may sell property free and clear of
third-party interests, including vested or contingent rights in dower
or curtesy.83 He may also sell property in which the estate and a
third party have undivided co-ownership. 84 The trustee's power
under section 363 overrides bankruptcy or ipsofacto clauses, 85 and
he is authorized to void sales controlled by collusive bidding.8 6 The
trustee generally cannot proceed against good faith purchases of
property sold under B.R.A. section 363,87 but, pursuant to B.R.A.
sections 542 and 543, he can demand the turnover of property of
the estate from third parties (whether custodians or non-
custodians).
B.R.A. section 363 is discouraging for the licensee because, un-
less the deposited material is shown to be property of the estate, the
trustee may sell it without finding a purchaser who would assume
the maintenance obligations of the licensor.88 The licensee would
thus not only lose the deposited material; it would also lose the
maintenance obligations of the licensor, crucial to its originally li-
censed software. The sale of the deposited material would probably
constitute an ordinary-course transaction requiring no court ap-
proval, but even a non-ordinary course transaction would afford the
77. See generally the legislative history at 9 BANKR. L. ED. §§ 82:16, 83:6 (Bancroft-
Whitney 1979 & Supp. 1984).
78. B.R.A. § 363(b); In re Hanline, 8 Bankr. 449, 7 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 256
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981).
79. B.R.A. § 363(c)(1).
80. B.R.A. § 363(c)(2). Under B.R.A. § 362(a), "cash collateral" means "cash, negoti-
able instruments, documents of title, securities, deposit accounts, or other cash equivalents in
which the estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest." See generally 2
BANKR. L. ED. § 15:61 (Bancroft-Whitney 1979 & Supp. 1984).
81. B.R.A. § 363(c)(4).
82. B.R.A. § 363(d),(e).
83. B.R.A. § 363(f),(g); 2 BANKR. L. ED. § 15:70 (Bancroft-Whitney 1979 & Supp.
1984).
84. B.R.A. § 363(h).
85, B.R.A. § 3630).
86. B.R.A. § 363(n); 2 BANKR. L. ED. § 15:78 (Bancroft-Whitney 1979 & Supp. 1984).
87. B.R.A. § 363(m); 2 BANKR. L. ED. § 15:77 (Bancroft-Whitney 1979 & Supp. 1984).
88. Nycum, Debugging Software Escrow. 441, 458-59.
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licensee only notice and the opportunity for a hearing. Leading
commentators maintain that "[t]he bankruptcy court has broad dis-
cretion in approving the terms of the sale of some or all of the
debtor's assets, and there can be no guarantee that a licensee would
be adequately protected."89 The licensee, a general creditor, would
not be shielded by the code's concept of adequate protection.90 Nor
could the licensee rely on the bankruptcy clause in the software es-
crow; B.R.A. section 363(1) reduces it to a dead article.9 1
E. The Trustee's Power to Assume or Reject Executory
Contracts
The licensee's expectation to receive the deposited material is
also likely to be rendered illusory by the trustee's power to assume
or reject so-called "executory contracts" pursuant to B.R.A. section
365. It will be instructive, therefore, to describe this power and to
suggest how the licensee might plan against it.
An executory contract is generally defined as a contract with
substantial performance remaining on both sides,92 but authority
exists that substantial performance remaining on even one side will
make a contract executory.93 The trustee has the power to assume
or to reject executory contracts. This power is based on the judicial
doctrine of abandonment, which provides that assignees are not
bound to accept onerous or unprofitable property.94 For reasons of
due process," if the contract was in default, the trustee's power to
assume executory contracts is suspended until the trustee cures the
default or compensates for actual loss or provides adequate assur-
ance of future performance. 96 Default cannot be conditioned on the
89. Id at 459.
90. 2 BANKR. L. ED. §§ 15:68, 15:69 (Bancroft-Whitney 1979 & Supp. 1984).
91. Re Cahokia Downs, Inc., 5 Bankr. 529, 6 BANKR. CT. DEC. (CRR) 925,2 COLLIER
BANKR. CAs. 2D (MB) 988 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1980); HOUSE REPORT at 346; 2 BANKR. L. ED.
§ 15:76 (Bancroft-Whitney 1979 & Supp. 1984).
92. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MNN. L. REv. 439,
460 (1973).
93. In re American Magnesium Co., 488 F.2d 147 (5th Cir. 1974); and see Weintraub &
Resnick, What is an Executory Contract? A Challenge to the Countryman Test, 15 U.C.C. L.
J. 273 (1983) (the authors, though in support of the Countryman test, approved of a decision
holding that a land sale contract was not executory despite substantial nonperformance on
both sides because the decision was based on the intent to enlarge the estate, to further the
rehabilitation of the debtor, and to provide adequate protection to creditors).
94. Countryman, Executory Contracts in Bankruptcy: Part I, 57 MINN. L. REv. at 440-
450.
95. Re Southeastern Truck Body & Trailer Corp., 6 Bankr. 730 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn.
1980).
96. B.R.A. § 365(b); CowANs BANKRUPTCY LAW § 11.11.
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insolvency or financial condition of the debtor or the commence-
ment of a case.97 Rejection of the contract is deemed to constitute a
breach on the date before the filing of the petition. Thus, the ag-
grieved party becomes a general unsecured creditor.98
The trustee's power to reject executory contracts is permissive,
not mandatory.99 But if the trustee rejects the software escrow and
any separate software license agreement, the licensee loses access to
the deposited material as well as the rights to the originally-licensed
software. Planning against this double-crippling hazard is essential,
but the literature is almost totally silent on possible planning de-
vices. The leading commentators suggest that the software escrow
and the software license agreement be kept separate and that the
software escrow be structured so that the licensor has performed
fully upon deposit of the materials. 1" Keeping the escrow and the
license agreements separate is a sound idea; in this way, rejection of
the license will not lead to an automatic rejection of the escrow.
Limiting the licensor's duties to depositing the material is equally
sound. The software escrow cannot be executory - and thus sub-
ject to rejection - if only the escrow has unperformed obligations.
Under no circumstances should ipsofacto bankruptcy clauses be in-
cluded; they do no more than take up space on the printed page as
B.R.A. section 365(e) renders them invalid.
III. CONCLUSION
The software escrow is unlikely to survive under bankruptcy
law unless several conditions are met: 1) the licensor divests itself
of all property interests in the deposited material before the com-
mencement of bankruptcy; 2) the release of the deposited material is
conditioned on an event other than the financial situation or insol-
vency or bankruptcy of the licensor; and 3) unless the escrow agree-
ment is structured so that it becomes non-executory upon the
licensor's delivery of the deposited material. Proper planning is
thus essential. Patrons of the software escrow who refuse to re-
structure it may yet defend professional malpractice suits against
them when the software escrow fails of its essential purpose under
the bankruptcy law.
97. B.R.A. § 365(e). This provision has withstood constitutional challenges based on
Due Process. See Re National Shoes, Inc., 20 Bankr. 55 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); Re Sapolin
Paints, Inc., 5 Bankr. 412 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1980).
98. See generally COWANS BAN RUPTcY LAW, § 11.11.
99. Re Standard Furniture Co., 3 Bankr. 527 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1980).
100. Nycum, Debugging Software Escrow. 441, 460-61.
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